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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S·TATE OF UTAH
RENNOLD PENDER,
Plaintiff and Respondent:,
-vs.S. VV. DOWS.E and PEARL DOWSE,
his ,vife, JAY E. TREADWAY and
MARION MAVE TREADWAY, his
wife, and A. C. WHITTAKER,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. ·7949

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, A. C. WHITTAKER
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from the judgment and the order
denying defendants' motions for· new trial in this case
wherein plaintiff sued to quiet his title to the property,
to vacate and set aside a Sheriff's sale and D·eed and for
damages. The title of all the defendants' property at
issue is predicated upon an execution issued January 4,
1950 on a cost bill in another proceeding between Messrs.
Pender and Dowse. The Sheriff's sale was completed
March 14, 1950, the certificate was issued and recorded
March 23, 1950, no redemption was made and then a
Sheriff's Deed was ex~cuted, delivered and recorded Sep-
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tember 16, 1950 in favor of S. W. Dowse.
This· appealing defendant, A. C. Whittaker, thereafter was requested to loan $5000.00 to S. W. Do,vse and
his wife and was offered a first mortgage lien upon lots
2, 3 and 4 of Block 8, North Colun1bia Subdivision a~
security for the loan. Mr. Dowse procured a policy of title
· insurance showing himself as the owner and exhibited
such to A. C. Whittaker (R. 173). He testified that: "I
wouldn't be interested unless I knew the title was clear,"
(R. 124) and then in reliance upon a policy of title in·surance issued after the n1ortgage fron1 S. W. Dowse and
Pearl Dowse had been recorded (R. 170), he loaned the
$5000.00 November 1, 1950. This loan has not been repaid
and A. C. Whittaker claims a first 1nortgage lien on these
three lots.
We shall sun1marize the facts in the case particularly
as the same relate to .the issue of the validity of the first
mortgage of the defendant, A. C. Whittaker upon Lots
2, 3 and 4 of Block 8, North Columbia Subdivision in Salt
Lake County, Utah. These lots are situated at the corner
of 13th South and West Temple Streets and there is
in evidence an abstract of title, introduced by the plaintiff, Exhibit "F" (R. 74).
The record shows that on October 30, 1950, S. W.
Dowse and Pearl Dowse executed and delivered to thi~
defendant, A. C. Whittaker, their Promissory Note, Exhibit 7 (R. 159) and a real estate 111ortgage, I1~xhihit "I/•
(R. 159). The said n1ortgage shows that th~ san1e was
duly recorded and was executed to secure the loan n1ade
in the sum of $5000.00 as evidenced bv the said note and
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1nortgag·e. Prior to the execution of said note and mortgage and the making of the loan,· Mr. Dowse exhibited
to Mr. vVhittaker a policy of title insurance, Exhibit 9
(R. 171), dated October 9, 1950, showing the title to said
property vested in the name of S. W. Dowse, subject to
certain minor tax and other liens, and Mr. Whittaker
testified as to said matter as follows :

"Q. What is that please~
.A... That is policy of title insurance in the name of
S. W. Dowse for $10,000, dated October 9th,
1950.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Now, I will ask you whether or not this policy
was ever showed to you prior to your seeing
the policy just previously mentioned~
Yes, Mr. Dowse told me he had ti tie insurance
on this and I saw this.
You saw this~
Yes.
Prior to the transaction?
Yes.
Did you or did you not rely on this~ ,
I absolutely relied on this title insurance, yes
s1r.
You absolutely identify this as the title insurance policy you saw 1
Yes sir." (R. 171-172)

Then at the tin1e of closing the transaction, Mr.
Dowse procurred a policy of title insurance, Exhibit 8
(R. 110) and Mr. Whittaker testified in response to a
question as to whether he had any evidence of the condition of the title to the property presented to him.
3
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"A. I was furnished With title insurance.
Q. I will sho\v you \vhat has been 1uarked Proposed Exhibit "8" and ask you to exruuine
that and state \vhat that is.
A/ This is policy of title insurance rove ring the
loan." (R. 160)
He testified on cross-examination as to the method
of closing the loan.

"Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

Now then did you talk to the Insurance con1pany before they issued ·the policy~
I did not, no sir.
I take it Mr. Dowse went to them and got the
policy and delivered it to you~
He did.
He never discussed it \vith you~
Not the title.
Did Mr. Dowse ever tell you he bought this
property at execution sale~
Not prior to this -not prior to the rnortgage.
When did he tell you~
After this case was instituted, I was a party
defendant.
But you never yourself talked to the title
people~
~1:R.

Q.

CHRISTENSON: I object to that
again. It is repetitious and furthern1ore it
doesn't direct us to any time, particular RUhject or refPrence to this ease.
(by MR. DAINES:) I a1n referring to DPfendants Exhibit "8" and I will ask you if yon
at any· ti1ne ever talked to the title people before they issued thi~ poliey?
-1-
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1;e.forp the~· i~~ued this policy, no sir.
Q. \\:'""as the poliey issued before or after execution of the n1ortgage ~
..:\.. The policy \\·as delivered with the mortgage
and note at the tin1e I gave him the· check for
$5,000.00." (R. 167 -168)
\

.... \..

Additional testimony by Mr. Whittaker relative- to
the transaction and issuance of the title insurance IS
found at page 120 of the Record:
~'Q.
nir. \\~hittaker, prior to lending money on
this property, did you, or did you not have a
discussion \vith Mr. Dowse relative to a policy
of title insurance~
A. Why we rnay have talked about title insur~
ance.
Q. Did you ask for either abstract or title insurance)?
A.
Q.

Title insurance.
And this was prior to the date you have testified that the policy was delivered to you, and
that you paid the $5,000 over to him~
A. Yes sir, yes indeed.
Q. And did you examine this policy of title insurance- \veil, did you read it~
A. Casually I read it." (R. 170)

The Promissory Note for $5,000 was payable 2 years
froin date with interest payable semi-annually. As the interest was not paid during the first two semi-annual periods, this defendant declared the entire amount to be due
and owing, 1nade demand for payment and then when
nothing was paid, on March 7, 1952 he started action to
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forclose the mortgage by case K o. 9470() entitled A. C.
Whittaker v. S. W. Dowse and Pearl Do\\~se (R. 160).
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff therein,
A. C. Whittaker, for the amount of principal, interest,
attorneys' fee and costs prayed for and a Decree of Foreclosure of the mortgage and Order of Sale were duly entered by the Court.
In the present litigatio~, an appraiser, representing
the plaintiff, testified that in his opinion the value of the
three lots affected by the mortgage and in which 1\Ir.
Whittaker asserts his interest was, as of the date of
March 14, 1950, worth $6,000.00. (R. 79). This appraisal
was based upon the assumption that:

"Q.

Mr. LeCheminant, you were asked the value
of this property under execution sale, have
you had opportunity to buy property under
execution sale~
A. No, I haven't.
Q. Are you aware of the fact, an execution sale
on real estate is subject to the right of redemption by the owner of the property?
A. I know that.
Q. The purchaser n1ay or may not have title, depending on whether the owner redeen1s in that
period of time J
A. l\fy opinion of value is all based on good Inarketable title.
Q. Based further on the fact the vendor would
furnish title 1
A. It n1ust be a good marketable title.
Q. And based further on th(-l assun1ption the
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....-\.

vendor \Yould give l~vidence of title either by
abstract or title insurance'?
rrhat is eorrect.'' (R. 84)

. A. s to the basic title in litigation, 've shall direct our
attention solely to these three lots on the corner of 13th
South and West Te1nple. The abstract of title covering
the srune (Exhibit "G") is a part of the record and reveals the follo,ving background of title evidence : starting
with 1916 there was a tax sale to Salt Lake County resulting in an Auditor's Tax Deed on Lot 2 on May 15,
1922. Then on all three lots there was a 1931 tax sale followed ·by an _._~uditor's Tax Deed dated April 10, 1936.
The tax title there to 'vas then sold to S. W. Dowse ·for
·$750.00 by Deed of Salt Lake County dated August 27,
1945. This tax title was in turn sold .by S. W. Dowse to
l~ennold Pender by Quit Clain1 Deed dated August 10,
1945, recorded Septeinber 4, 1945. No revenue stamps
are affixed and only nominal consideration is stated.
']hereafter Mr. Pender apparently procurred Quit Claim
Deeds from various heirs of former owners for nominal
consideration only, and later completed a quiet title action against other claimants.
As of the dates of the Levy, ·sheriff's Sale and
Sheriff's Deed in Case No. 8689·5 (Jan. 4, 1950, ·Mar. 14,
1950 and Sept. 16, 1950) there was ·no recorded decree in
the quiet title action, so the interests of Olive Trickett
et al. were still outstanding of record and there were
unpaid taxes o'ving to Salt Lake County for 1949 in the
amount of $161.36 and acerued 1950 taxes due on the
prem1ses. In addition there was a $13.20 judgment lien

.

7
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and the further judgment lien in favor of Morandi
(Exhibit 11) for $3068.44.
Let us examine the facts of the execution sale as revealed by an abstract of title on these three lots mortgaged to Mr. Whittaker. The judgment appears to bP
regular in all respects (see file in Case No. 86895 showing
service of copies of the Findings, Decree and Cost Bill
upon the attorneys for Mr. Pender and the admission of
regularity thereof as stated in the pretrial order). The
·execution levy was duly recorded F'ebruary 9, 1950 in
Book 740, page 527 thereby giving constructive notice to
.Mr .. Pender and all the world. The Sheriff's Certificate
of Sale, dated March 1?, 1950 was recorded J\farch :2:1.
1950 and is regular and complete in each and every detail
and gave constructive notiee to Mr. Pender and all th~
world of the sale_ and right of redemption as provided
by law. The Sheriff's Deed, dated September 16, 1950
was recorded on the sarne date and likewise 'vas regular
and complete in all details and particulars and gave notice
to Mr. Pender and all of the world of the fact that title
had passed without redemption and that S. W. Dowse
wa.s the owner of the title formerly claimed by R.ennold
Pender.
Mr. T. N. Bleak, who was the rhief civil deputy in
the office of the Salt Lake County Sheriff at the time
of the Sheriff's Sale in question, testified concerning the
procedure followed at the Sheriff's Sale and particularly
as to the n1ethod of giving notice of the time of the said
sale on cross examination :
"B1.,. J\1R. PUGSI~E)T (On behalf of the defPndan~
Whittaker)
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Q.
.A..

Q.

A.

. :\.

Q.

A.

Q.
1\..

Jlr. Bleak \\~hat notic.es were posted prior to
the time of the sale Y
The notice of levy 'vas first posted, I think, on
the - the copy of notice, levy and the copy of
execution were first recorded with the Recorder of the County, and then the law requires that we either post or serve the tenant
in possession of the property a copy of notice
of levy, which was done, and afterwards we
were on February, or close to February the
17th the first notice of sale wa.s published in
the Salt Lake Times and for four weeks, and
there 'vas· no den1and on my part made of Mr.
Pender, or no copy served on him personally
after it was recorded in the Recorder's office.
Are there any notices posted about the City
and County Building in Salt Lake- relative
to these sales~
Yes there are usually three.
11:R. DAINES: I move to strike the word
"'usually" .
There are three in my handling of foreclosure
sales, all the sales under execution, three
notices are posted at the County Building.
(by ~fr. Pugsley) Are there also notices
posted in three public places in Salt Lake
County?
The notice of sale is always posted on th~
property, one copy, and two copies in the preci:p.ct in addition to the one posted at the
COUll ty building.
Is that the customary posting done in this
sale1
That was the way-

9
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Q.

A.

Q.
A.

"BY
Q.

A.

Q.

·MR. DAIXES: Just a ntinute1\IR. PLTGSLEY: Let 1ne finish.
(by i:\Ir. Pugsley) Is that the custornary po~t
ing you did on all this type of execution ~ales!
MR. DAINES: I object, it is incoinpeten t, irrelevant and immaterial.
THE COL1 RT: It is overruled.
That was always the custom in the sheriff's
office to post notices just in that manner in
all real estate sales.
Thatwas done in this sale~
Yes." (R. 142-143)
MR. PUGSLEY: (On behalf oft~ defendant
Whittaker)
May I ask one further question~
· Do you· know how 1uany notices were
posted on this property there in question~
I don't recall now, Mr. Pugsley, but it is my
recollection I posted notices on each one of the
pieces of property that were listed on the
praecipe as long as they were contiguous to
each other, as long as the lots 'vere contiguou~
to each other, I only post one copy of the
notice on each piece of property.
Those not contiguous you posted ~eparate
notices~

A.

Q.
A.

I posted separate notice on those not eontiguous to each other.
MR. PlTGS.LEY: rrhat is all.
You posted on thrPe or four pie<·Ps of property~ (by 1\lr. Daines)
Four or five a~ l renH~lnher~ ~\1 r. DainP!"~ l

1.0
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posted on the corners or in the i1nn1ediate
vicinity of all the pieces of property." (R. 144)
The Court did not make any 'findings contrary to
the evidence stated by the said deputy sheriff and the
Court did not find that any lack of notice existed or failure of any recording of the time of sale or the certificate
of sale or Sheriff's Deed. The only findings made by
the Court relating to the procedure of the sale were as
follo,vs:
"13. That the property, at the time it was
offered and sold at Sheriff's Sale was offered and
sold enn1asse and that said property was not at
any time offered at sale in separate parcels. That
it was apparent that 1nore than enougn property
required to be sold to satisfy said judgment, was
being sold at the sale. That defendant S.. W.
Dowse and his attorney, LaMar Duncan, were the
only persons present to bid at said sale. That no
return was attached to the execution showing that
the sheriff had made any attempt to satisfy the
judgment by the sale .of unexempt personal property belonging to plaintiff."
"15. That the levy so made by the sheriff was
excessive and the price for "vhich the property
'vas bid in was grossly inadequate and the said
sale was accompanied by irregularities. That the
public record under 'vhich the sale 'vas had reflected these facts."
The Sheriff issued in his regular and customary form
a Certificate of Sale, Mar. 23, 1950, and after the expir~
tion of the six months redemption period, a Sheriff's
Deed, dated Sept. 16, 1950. These were both duly recorded and contain nothing on the face thereof to reveal ,

11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to any purchaser, title exaininer or other person that the
said sale was conducted in any but the regular statutory
manner. There is no evidence of record to show or imply
that A. C. Whittaker had any actual notice of the procedure followed by the Sheriff in the advertising, offering
or sale of said property nor of the co1nparatively no1ninal
amount paid for the property by Mr. Dowse.
By this abreviated statement of facts, this defendant,
A. C. Whit'take,r, does not waive the other pertinent facts
or law that may be presented by the other defendants
jointly or severally in defense of their respectiYe positions. This defendant asserts that there is no factual or
legal basis for vacating the Sheriff's sale and Deed to
S. W. Dowse.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THAT A. C. WHITTAKER IS A BONA FIDE MORTGAGEE FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY TITLE
DEFECTS.

POINT TWO
THAT THE RECORD TITLE REVEALED NO PATENT
OR OTHER TITLE DEFECTS OR ANY INTERESTS OF
PLAINTIFF; AND HE MAY NOT lVIAKE A COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON THIS MORTGAGE OR THE SHERIFF'S DEED.

POINT THREE
THAT ALL INTERESTS OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THESE
THREE LOTS HAD BEEN COMPLETELY EXTINGUISHED
BY THE SHERIFF'S SALE AND DEED.

POINT FOUR
THAT THE SMALL AMOUNT OF CONSIDERATION AT
THE SHERIFF-'S SALE DID NOT PLACE A. C. WHITTAKER
ON ANY DUTY OF INQUIRY.

12
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POINT FIVE
THAT PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS THE PROTECTION
OF TITLES PASSING THROUGH SHERIFF'S SALES.

ARGUMENT
POINTS ONE AND TWO
THAT A. C. WHITTAKER IS A BONA FIDE MORTGAGEE FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY TITLE
DEFECTS.
THAT THE RECORD TITLE REVEALED NO PATENT
OR OTHER TITLE DEFECTS-OR ANY INTERESTS OF
PLAINTIFF; AND HE MAY NOT MAKE A COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON THIS MORTGAGE OR THE SHERIFF'S DEED.

The burden of proof in this type of case, as in many
others, is definitely on the plaintiff and we submit that
there has been no evidence of any character to show that
the defendant, A. C. Whitaker had any notice whatsoever
of the interest no'v asserted by Pender in and to these
three lots.
21 Am. Jur. 305:

"Ordinarily, the party seeking to vacate· an
execution has the burden of proof, and the court
rnust presume the execution to have been regular,
until proof ha.s been adduced to the contrary;
but where the circumstances are such a.s to make
the execution prima facie invaltd, he who seeks
to sustain it must introduce evidence to prove its
validity."
I

The evidence shows a good marketable 'title of record
and a complete reliance on the part of Mr. Whittaker on
the marketability thereof as shown by the policy of title
insurance issued in such form as to reflect his m·o!tgage
as a first lien upon the property. He testified that Mr.

13
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Do,vse had never advised hin1 of any intere~t as!"erted by
Mr. Pender and there had been no occasion to discuss any
such matter between them at the ti1ne of 1naking the loan.
It was not until after this action had been instituted and
1fr. Whittaker had been served with Sun1n1ons that he
made inquiry of 1\{r. Dowse concerning the clain1s of ~Ir.
Pender. The evidence is \vithout dispute that the three
lots in question were vacant and there was nothing about
them that would indicate an ownership interest that might
be asserted by .Mr. Pender. Without any admission as
to any pretended signs on certain war surplus materials
behind the service station on other lots in the la\v suit, it
must be kept clear that nothing appears in the record indicating. a sign or personal property or other i te1n that
would excite the inquiry of Mr. Whittaker or anyone else
dealing with or in!suring the title to the three lots at the
corner of 13th S.outh and West Temple.
The record title of the property showed no residual
interest or clairn that might be asserted by 1\{r. Pender
after the expiration of the reden1ption period and the
issuance of the Sheriff's Deed to Mr. S. W. Dowse. The
execution creditor and purchaser, prior to the issuance
of the ·policy of title insurance and the passing of the
money from Mr. Whittaker to him, had paid off the outstanding tax encumbrances and recorded the necessary
documents to eliminate the outstanding adverse interests
that had been subjects of quiet title actions at an earlier
date. One does not know what would be expected of a
purchaser or 1nortgagee if he n1ust investigate, by personal inctuiry, each and every step of a recordPd ti tie and
1-t
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probe into the detail~ of all judicial sales that appear of
record in a regular and complete form.
The title, having appeared to the mortgagee and the
title insurance con1pany as being full and complete and
that the mortgage was a first lien upon the prop·erty, we
find that the present action is a collateral attack upon the
mortgage by one who is not a party thereto. The Sheriff
was not made a party defendant. The appeal period on
the judgment for costs had expired, the appeal period on
the cost bill had expired, the reden1ption period had /expired and the Sheriff's Deed had issued, and for all appearances the plaintiff, Pender, had been fully divested
of any sen1blance of ownership in and to the three lots
mortgaged to A. C. Whittaker. Plaintiff does not contend
that the sale by the Sheriff was "void" but only voidable.
One of the most serious flaws in the plaintiff's proceeding is that he has made a collateral attack upon the
deed issued by the Sheriff, without making the Sheriff
a party defendant, and also that the plaintiff has endeavored to impeach this written document as well as the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale by parol evidence. The action
of the Trial Court in permitting such an impeachment of
the deed and Certificate of Sale opens a wide field for litigation on ahnost every title that has passed through a
Sheriff's sale at any point in its history. An element of
uncertainty will be injected in the conveyancing practice's
throughout the State of Utah of such magnitude that no
one vvill be willing to risk the approval of an abstract
of title nor the issuance of a policy of title insurance if at
any f'tage a Sheriff's conveyance or other judicial pro-
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ceeding such as a probate sale, receiver's sale, foreclosure
of mortgage, or execution on judgment is involved.
It is the position of this appealing defendant that it is
in viola·tion of the Constitution of the State of Utah to
allow the judgment of the Court to stand in this case~
as such deprives this defendant of his property rights
without just compensation and without due process of
law.

POINTS THREE AND FOlTR
THAT ALL INTERESTS OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THESE
THREE LOTS HAD BEEN COMPLETELY EXTINGUISHED
BY THE SHERIFF'S SALE AND DEED.
THAT THE SMALL Al\10UNT OF CONSIDERATION AT
THE SHERIFF'S SALE DID NOT PLACE A. C. WHITTAKER
ON ANY DUTY OF INQUIRY.

It is well settled that a mortgagee such as A. C. Whittaker, who was in good faith loaned $5,000.00 upon property that is appraised at $6000.00 in value, is regarded
as a bona fide purchaser thereof.
59

C.J.S.

302:

Rights of Mortgagee

"A mortgagee of reality is regarded a~ a purchaser thereof; and, if his mortgage i~ support eo
by an actual present consideration and is gi\len
and taken in good faith and 'vithout fraud, heiR to
be treated as a bona fide purchaser for value, and
as such protected against ad verse· clain1s of \vhieh
he has no notice, actual or eonstruetive, i JH·luding
not only prior deeds or other conveyances of the
premises, but also all other liens on the1n or elailll~
of interest in the1n, sneh as prior 1nortgages or
Yendor's liens."
·
It is not eontended by the plruntiff that this

Rheriff'~
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8ale i~ vo,id, but n1erely that there are some Inatters or
confidential relationship or 1ninor irregularities that
should permit the advoidanee of the transaction at this
late date. Therfore, any interest that the plaintiff had
in the three lots 'vas con1pletely extinguished by the
Sheriff's execution, sale and deed the-reon. If there is a
re-vesting of the title back in the plaintiff as a result of
the present proceedings, such title must be subject to the
bona fide first mortgage lien asserted by Mr. A. C. Whittaker.
Our Supreme Court has considered son1e of these
issues, and we should like to refer to one of the more
recent decisions. Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96 Utah ·
297, 85 Pac. (2d) 770. Therein your Court considered
the rights of the parties during the redemption period and
held that a purchaser at execution sale acquires all the
right, title, interest and claim of the debtor, including
the right of possesion, legal title, and rights to crops
harvested during the rede1nption period, after expiration
of the redemption period and not before. The court cited
Sec. 104-37-29, U.C.A., 1943, which reads:
"lT pon a sale of real property, the purchaser
is substituted for and acquires all the right, title,
interest and claim of the judg1nent debtor thereto·"

'

The court pointed out that the legal ti tie does not
pas's under a mortgage foreclosure sale until the sale
is consummated by a conveyance since there would be no
neees~ity for a conveyance if the legal title had already
passed, but after the conveyance then the title vests absolutely in the granteP frorn the sheriff.
17
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The case of Dickert z_:. W ei.-.,·e was early decided by
our Court ( 2 Ut. 350) as to validity of _a Sheriff's ~ale.
Under a decree of foreclosure the officer offered two lots
and had no bidders and then offered then1 together and
.sold them to plaintiff on a bid under the judgment. It
was held that such a sale was not invalid.
The status of the record in thi'S case no"'" before
the Court is that the execution sale was eonducted, the
redemption period was past and the Sheriff's Deed issued.
The reeord is complete 'vith the evidence that notice·~
were given as required by the statute of Utah for the
sale of 'the said property; that plaintiff frequently passed
the property; that the· plaintiff's agent, ~f r. Lartch, "'"ho
operated a service station on the adjacent property, observed the lots in issue and could and should have seen
the notices and advised the plaintiff thereof; in addition
the plaintiff had eonstructive notice of the levy and sale
by the recording of the execution levy, the posting of
notices upon the property, the posting in three public
places in ·salt Lake County, the posting of notirPs at the
Court House and the publication thereof in the Salt Lake
Times, a newspaper of general circulation within the
eounty, to which the plaintiff's· attorne~,. subscribed during the period of the publication of the notice. The only
attaek that apparently has any reason behind it i~ thr
claim that the property 'vas not sold in separatP }>:lr<·Pls
by the Sheriff. The testimony of the Deputy Sheriff,
T. N. Bleak, was that he 1na~e the recording of the notires, the posting and publication thereof and <'Onducted
the sale in the custo1nary 1nanner, but that because thertl
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'vere no other bidders pretsent, he did not do the useless
thing of requiring a separate bid on each individual lot
involved in the property, but offered the same by reading
the legal descriptions of the property out loud to the bidders present. The only bidders present were Mr. Dowse
and his attorney, Mr. LaMar Duncan, who both t~stified
that the property was offered in three parcels and that
three separate bids were 1nade by Mr. Duncan on behalf
of ~Ir. Dowse for the same.
We urge that the claim, that the Sheriff's Sale is-voidable because of the failure to offer each lot separately,
is not well taken in light of the decisions of our Supreme
Court. In the case of .Adams v. Pratt, 87 Utah 80,48 Pac.
-(2d) 444, the court held on a mortgage foreclosure sale,
which is a situation very similar to an execution sale, was
not void because of the sale of the property en mas'se.
"Nor do the authorities support plaintiff's
contention that the sale of the property in· the
mortgage foreclosure suit en masse is void. On the
contrary, thi~s court has held tha1 it is proper in the
mortgage foreclosure suit to sell the property en
masse if bids for the separate lots or parcels cannot be had. Dickert v. ·Weise, 2 Utah 350. The
cases are generally to the effect that a sale of
property en masse, even where it should be sold
separately, is not such an irregularity as renders
the sale void. 13urton v. Kipp, 30 Mont. 275, 76
P. 563: rrhomas V. Thomas, 44 Mont. 102, 119 P.
283, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 616; Fox v. Curry, 96 1\font.
212, 20 P. (2d) 663; Batini v. lvancich, 105 Cal.
.:\pp. 391, 287 P. 523; 23 C. J. 532-535."
It is to be noted that the Sheriff's Certificate of
Sale and the Sheriff's Deed do not reflect any of the prP
19
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tended deficiencies in procedure and hence a Inortgag~
for value, such as this defendant Whittaker, \vould haYe
absolutely no notice thereof. The n1atter of inadequacy
of price has been considered by our Court at an earlier
time and we find in the decision in the case of Young r.
Schroeder, 10 Ut. 155, Affirmed by U.S. Sup. Ct.161, U.S .
. 334, the following law; that though courts someti1ne set
aside a sale where great inadequacy of consider~ation exists, coupled with irregularities attending the sale, yet
they will not set aJside a sale after the redemption period
has expired where the irregularities are merely for1nal
and technical and did not have a direct tP-ndency to pre·
vent the realizing of a fair price for the property sold.
Certainly the burden of proof that the plaintiff had in this
case has not been discharged in showing that other bidders were prevented from offering higher or better price~
for the property by the pret~nded irregularity of the
Sheriff's failure to offer each individual lot ·separately at
the time of the sale. Certainly ii other or better bids
coUld have been procured, it was up to the plaintiff tL
produce evidence thereon. No other bidders were present
to n1ake any different offers.
A similar n1atter of consideration of inadequacy of
price is found in the case of National Realty Sales Co. v.
Ewing, 55 Utah 438, 186 Pac. 1103. Therein the court hPld
that an execution 'sale is not invalidated hy inadequacy
of price as against the judgment debtors grantee \\'herr
the proceedings \Vere fair and regular and there is
nothing of notice to the grantee that would suggest fraud
or cone(Jalment. Certainly th(J poliey of the la'v is thnt
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an exeeution sale that appears regular in all respects
should be protected by the courts otherwise the exchange
aD.d transfers of property 'Yould be interminably confused
and prejudiced. The n1ere fact that a small amount of
money was paid at the Sheriff's Sale did not place· this
defendant, Whittaker, on any duty of inquiry. The record
is full of title deficiencies that n1ay be pointed out to show
that a bona fide purchaser at a Sheriff's Sale would not
pay any su1n in excess of that actually paid as the· purchaser would be faced with numerous difficulties in redemption of delinquent taxes, clearing up title problems
and removing outstanding judgment liens. As we pointed
out in the Statement of Facts, the only 'vitness as to value
wws a real estate man who testified that his evidence presumed a good marketable title, free from all encumbrances, together with a Warranty Deed and abstract of
title. No one testified as to the reasonable value of this ·
property at execution sale, having in mind the status of
the same.
POINT FIVE
THAT PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS THE PROTECTION
OF TITLES PASSING THROUGH SHERIFF'S SALES.

As indicated above, the free exchange of property
involves a matter of public policy that dictates respect
for titles passing through execution sales as well as
through the regular course of conveyance. A decision by
our Supren1e Court at one time inferred that a small
iunount' of consideration alone would place a purchaser
on a duty of inquiry, but the Legislature felt that such
decision- Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Ut. 298, 212 Pac .
.>.26', was unlawful, and Section 78-1-6 was amended hy
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Chapter 106 of the 1945 session of the Legislature to pro·vide that:
"Neither the fact that an instrument recorded
as h~rein provided recite:-; only no1ninal consideration ... shall operate to charge any third person
with notice of the interest of any person or persons not nru11ed in such instrument or of the
grantor or grantors;"
The Utah State Bar Association has adopted certain
title standards, one of which, No. 10, reads as follows:
"The mere fact that a deed recites a nominal
consideration, or that the grantee in the instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports to be in trust should have
no significance, and title can be conveyed by the
named grantee as in ordinary cases. A nominal
consideration or indication of trust is no longer
notice of equitable interest unle,ss the instru1nent
itself, or some other independent instrument, is
recorded setting forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the beneficial or equitable interest held and describing the property eharged with
the trust. See Chapter 106, 1945 Session Law:-:.
(The rule is otherwise until May 8, 1946, as to
instruments recorded prior to l\fay 8, 1945.) ''
All of the~se reflect the general policy of the law that
the court will sustain a bona fide purchase for value or
mortgagee for. value even though the chain of title reflects a small amount of consideration. l\fore recently
in the case of Commercial Bank of [Jtah v. ltfadsen, :!:16
Pac. (2d) 343 your Court held that where a mortgag~
foreclosure sale \Vas regularly held and fairly conducted,
it would not be set asidP in the ahRenre of fraud n1Prrl~'
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·because a higher bid \Vas offered. Likewise the Court
held therein that the fact that the land sold at mortgage
foreclosure \Vas described as Lots 1 and 2 did not make
separate tracts of an otherwise unified parcel within the
statute relating to execution sales of real property.
Plaintiff elected not to sue the Sheriff whose deed
establishes the title. We submit, therefore, that the first
mortgage lien of A. C. Whittaker should be sustained
in all respects and that regardless of the outcome· of the
litigation between Mr. Pender and ~1r. Dowse, the mortgage lien of A. C. Whittaker niust be p·rotected ~d judgment quieting title against the same should be reversed.
We urge the Court to consider the effect of the present action of the District Court upon this title when
viewed as a precedent by la-\vyers and title insurance companies throughout the State of Utah. What lawyer will
feel safe in executing an opinion approving a title that
has pa.!ssed through any type of judicial sale, knowing
that a collateral attack may be brought to impeach the
recorded documents upon \Vhich the title is passed. The
far reaching effect of this decision will be felt in not only
foreclosure and execution sales, but also in the probate
of estates of decedents, guardian's sales, receiverships,
etc. The innumerable land titles that have passed through
judicial sales will all be placed in jeopardy and a chaotic
title condition will result if the action of the District
Court is sustained.
\Ve urge that this Court reverse the judgment of the
District Court and direct said Court to enter findings and
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judgment that the mortgage held by A. C. Whittaker is a
first lien upon the premises described therein.
Respectfully submitted,

HARRY D. Pl:GSLEY
of
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTOK
721 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
GORDON B. CHRISTENSON
Judge Building
S·alt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for A. C. Whittaker,
D·efendant and Appellant.
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